An Empirical Study of Fund Distribution Fees under Tacit Collusion and the Impact of Competition Enhancing Policies: Evidence from the Korean Fund Market |
Kang Baek, Young S. Park, Seong Ho Park |
펀드 판매보수 담합징후와 경쟁촉진 정책효과에 대한 실증연구 |
백강, 박영석, 박성호 |
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Abstract |
This study analyzes the effectiveness of competition-enhancing policies to erode the tacit price collusion among oligopolistic fund distributors in the Korean market. According to our empirical results, the variance of fund distribution fees and market shares were lower during the conspiracy period than during the more competitive period. Also, after enforcing competition-enhancing policies, the negative relationship between price and demand strengthened and the fund distribution fee differentials by sales decreased. This implies that investors` welfare was partially improved as competition-enhancing policies lead the fund distributors to cheat on collusion. However, in view of the result that price rigidity recently reemerged, we propose that a range of lasting antitrust policies should be implemented in the Korean fund market. |
Key Words:
가격경직성,경쟁촉진 정책,암묵적 담합,펀드 판매보수,펀드판매사,Tacit Collusion,Price Rigidity,Fund Distributor,Distribution Fees,Competition Enhancing Policy |
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